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Science, Intersubjective Validity,  
and Judicial Legitimacy 
Richard B. Katskee† 
The problems associated with discovering truth in the 
courtroom are well known. Eyewitness testimony is notoriously 
unreliable. Statistics are almost endlessly manipulable. Paid 
experts slant their findings or, less disreputably, perhaps, but 
equally effectively, adjust the questions that they ask in order 
to yield findings supporting the party who hired them. But in 
litigating challenges to the incorporation of religious beliefs 
packaged as science into public-school curricula,1 my concern 
with the relationship between expert testimony and scientific 
truth has less to do with the mechanics of weighing possibly 
conflicting expert opinions than with the deference so often 
afforded to those who don the trappings of science, whether 
they engage in bona fide scientific research or merely peddle 
nonscientific truth-claims masquerading as science. 
Although much of this symposium has focused, in one 
way or another, on whether science offers a window on the 
truth commensurate with the pride of place that scientific 
evidence receives in legal factfinding, that question may be  
too narrow to acknowledge the full value of scientific evidence 
in judicial proceedings. If scientific research offers access to  
truth that other forms of evidence do not, affording it extra 
deference makes perfect sense. But whether ultimate or objec-
tive truth even exists, and, if so, whether we as humans have 
epistemic access to it (through scientific inquiry or otherwise), 
are metaphysical puzzles that have plagued philosophers and 
  
 † Assistant Legal Director, Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State. 
 1 The author was one of the principal attorneys for the plaintiffs in the 2005 
case successfully challenging the inclusion of intelligent-design creationism in the 
biology curriculum at a public high school in Dover, Pennsylvania. See Kitzmiller v. 
Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005). The author has since 
served as lead counsel in other cases involving the teaching of intelligent design, 
creation science, and other religiously based attacks on the scientific theory of 
evolution. 
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theologians since at least Plato’s day; and it is not clear that we 
are any closer to solving them than the Ancient Greeks were. 
Courts must, of course, set aside those thorny issues in 
performing their daily tasks, acting instead as though ultimate 
truth exists and is reasonably accessible to anyone who in good 
faith looks for it. Otherwise, metaphysical and epistemological 
anxieties would overwhelm courts’ ability ever to provide 
definitive judgments. But the need for courts to act as though 
they can discover ultimate truth through ordinary legal 
proceedings does not resolve the deeper questions. Nor, 
therefore, does it justify viewing science in the courtroom as 
useful for getting to the truth of the matter being adjudicated. 
Irrespective of the metaphysical status of ultimate 
truth, or of science’s relation to it, a better question may be 
whether anything about the nature of science (whether or not it 
relates to the capacity to reveal truth) warrants setting 
scientific evidence above other categories of truth-claims as a 
grounding for legal judgments. As background for considering 
that question, Part I provides a more detailed statement of the 
concern about courts’ institutional competence to deal with 
scientific evidence, and Part II describes courts’ institutional 
aims and the value of publicly justified judicial rulings for 
achieving those aims. Part III explains why science as a 
discipline has special power to promote shared understanding. 
And Part IV seeks to defend the respect that courts show to 
scientific evidence in light of the public confidence in the legal 
system that follows from judgments’ being rooted in shared 
understandings of the sort that science provides. 
The point is, in the end, a simple one: Scientific evidence 
has special value in legal proceedings because science confers 
intersubjective validity that other categories of truth-claims 
often lack. It offers factfinders and concerned observers a 
common yardstick against which to measure the validity and 
explanatory power of proffered evidence. So opinions grounded 
in science carry their own tests for reliability and usefulness, 
thus inspiring special confidence in judgments based on them. 
And by fostering greater public trust in legal rulings, 
judgments premised on scientific evidence reinforce the legal 
system’s ability to resolve disputes that might otherwise 
threaten a peaceful, well-ordered society. 
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I. THE INSTITUTIONAL-COMPETENCE PROBLEM 
In defending, at least in general (if not necessarily in 
specific cases), the role that science plays in legal proceedings, I 
am not deaf to the frequently voiced complaint that juries and 
judges are ill suited to the task of evaluating competing 
scientific claims. The complaint is one about institutional 
competence: Factfinders are not trained as scientists, so they 
are unlikely to possess the substantive knowledge and 
analytical skills required to parse scientific claims; and far 
from making up for those deficiencies, the adversary system 
compounds the problem by driving parties to present skewed 
accounts and to gloss over weaknesses and inconsistencies in 
the methodologies employed, the data collected, and the 
conclusions drawn by experts testifying on their behalf.  
But while institutional-competence concerns are certainly 
important, complaints about courts’ inability to understand 
science are not terribly informative when divorced from 
consideration of institutional objectives. And when courts’ 
institutional purpose and social role are taken into account, 
criticisms of factfinders’ supposedly dismal performance in 
evaluating scientific evidence may be overblown. 
Consider a run-of-the-mine tort case in which the 
factfinder (whether judge or jury) must decide which party is 
providing the best account of how some injury occurred. 
Irrespective of what that injury is, or what the legal claims are, 
or what proof each party offers, it is natural to wonder whether 
the factfinder will have knowledge and experience of the 
relevant sorts, and in sufficient measure, to weigh the 
evidence, evaluate the competing arguments, and come to the 
correct conclusion—in other words, to figure out the truth of 
the matter. And when apparently conflicting scientific evidence 
is a trial’s centerpiece, the anxiety deepens: If we doubt judges’ 
and juries’ ability to evaluate witnesses’ credibility, for 
example, even though everyone enters the courtroom with at 
least some independent experience distinguishing truthfulness 
from deceit, must we not be even more skeptical of factfinders’ 
capacity to weigh competing scientific claims, when so few 
among us possess even rudimentary training in that 
enterprise? After all, most judges and jurors are unlikely to 
have ever before tried to make sense of the sorts of data being 
put before them in a trial; they may be swayed by flash rather 
than substance; and even when they would otherwise possess 
sufficient acumen to separate scientific wheat from junk-
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science chaff, their efforts may be stymied by the parties’ 
attempts to sweep under the rug the limitations of an expert 
witness’s research program and the qualifiers that would 
inevitably accompany the findings if they were presented in 
even the most slipshod research paper. 
But if factfinders’ evaluation of expert testimony is good 
enough to allow courts to fulfill their designated social role, 
then courts are sufficiently competent as factfinders to consider 
the evidence for purposes of deciding cases. And judicial 
decisions will be acceptably reliable, even if judges’ and juries’ 
evaluations of competing scientific claims might sometimes be 
unsophisticated enough to bring tears to the eyes of any high-
school biology or physics teacher—much less to a qualified 
researcher working in the relevant field of study. So 
determining institutional competence to evaluate scientific 
evidence requires looking, in the first instance, not at 
factfinders’ scientific acumen, but at courts’ designated social 
role. 
II. LEGAL JUDGMENTS AND INTERSUBJECTIVE VALIDITY 
As John Locke explained, law courts are a prerequisite 
to social stability: Impartial judges empowered to make 
definitive legal rulings provide a mechanism for disputants to 
resolve their disagreements without having to resort to 
physical violence or other self-help remedies.2 We set up judges 
and courts as higher authorities with the power to declare who 
wins and who loses, who receives compensation and who pays, 
who exacts retribution and who suffers punishment, not 
because we think that they will always get things exactly right, 
but just because deferring to a neutral arbiter helps ensure 
that we don’t end up in blood feuds to resolve every petty 
grievance. But a legal system prevents interpersonal violence 
and quells broader social strife only if both the parties to 
particular controversies and the public in general are in the 
end willing to accept and obey legal judgments. For if not, 
invoking the judicial process might delay, but will not prevent, 
resorts to bloodshed. It thus turns out that disputes over how 
to assess the reliability of various categories of evidence or how 
to deal with factfinders’ possibly inept weighing of truth-claims 
implicate deeper issues of political legitimacy: If a court is to 
  
 2 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 13, 19-20 (1690).  
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resolve disputes definitively and finally, and hence to justify 
invoking political authority to enforce its orders, it must 
persuade those subject to its rulings to trust it to decide who 
should bear the costs of an accident or who should receive 
punishment for a crime—in other words, to make conclusive 
determinations regarding litigants’ fates. 
In light of that socially important, but in a metaphysical 
sense fairly modest, institutional aim, courts need not be 
infallible expositors of truth. In most cases, it is enough that a 
court comes to some decision—any decision—that the parties 
will accept as dispositive. For courts don’t just attempt to 
ascertain truth; they define it. Justice Jackson’s famous 
aphorism, “We are not final because we are infallible, but we 
are infallible only because we are final,”3 provides a pointed 
reminder that a judicial ruling makes true as a legal matter 
the findings that it encompasses, irrespective of whether the 
judge, jury, or appellate tribunal got everything exactly right. 
Judicial fiat is not, of course, a terribly satisfying basis for 
dispute resolution; and hence, it alone is not a secure 
grounding for a legal system. But if the parties and the public 
have the considered conviction that courts do a pretty good job 
finding facts, deciding cases, and resolving disagreements most 
of the time—in other words, that the legal system on the whole 
serves us better than trying to settle the score ourselves 
whenever we feel wronged—then we will generally be willing to 
let the courts act as final arbiter. And we will usually accept 
even unfavorable judgments from them. 
Thus, what matters for a legal system’s legitimacy is, in 
the first instance, that losers in legal actions believe that the 
treatment they received from the courts was at least minimally 
fair and respectful of them as the prevailing parties’ political 
equals. A losing party must be able to see that the court has 
listened to its arguments, weighed all the relevant evidence, 
and explained the ruling in a way that the party can recognize 
as a valid—albeit unfavorable and perhaps imperfect—exercise 
of judicial authority. As I have suggested elsewhere,4 the losers’ 
view matters most because winners do not need to have their 
victories justified to them. Unless a prevailing party expects to 
be a repeat player in litigation, fighting the same battle against 
future opponents in other cases, it is unlikely to care why it 
  
 3 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 4 Richard B. Katskee, Why It Mattered to Dover that Intelligent Design Isn’t 
Science, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 112, 153-54 (2006). 
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won: Knowing that it won is quite satisfying enough. But to the 
unsuccessful litigant, quite a lot depends on believing that the 
arbitrator was impartial, that the hearing was fair, and that 
the final decision fell within at least a broad range of outcomes 
warranted by the evidence when evaluated using permissible 
forms of analysis. A litigant’s views about a judgment on those 
dimensions may make the difference between accepting an 
unfavorable ruling and keeping the fight going outside the 
courts. 
Stepping back from the parties’ views of any single case 
to an aggregate social perspective, the procedures that a legal 
system employs and the judgments that it produces, when 
taken all together, have to be fair enough, both on average and 
in the most significant cases, to encourage members of the 
society to keep reverting to the courts as the principal 
mechanism for resolving disputes. Courts’ legitimacy depends, 
in other words, not just on individual losing parties’ walking 
away with the conviction that a courtroom was the proper 
venue to resolve grievances (however upset the parties might 
have been about the final verdict), but on the public’s having 
faith that the legal process will afford a fair hearing and 
generally fair treatment to those who invoke it—and that the 
courts will give careful, respectful consideration even to 
nonparties’ interests when they are implicated in lawsuits. 
If courts are to provide what most of us will regard as a 
fair trial in those senses, and hence to instill confidence that 
the legal system is the right place to turn to resolve 
disagreements, they must base their rulings on publicly 
accessible facts, which they must then weigh, measure, and 
test using publicly accessible forms of legal reasoning. In other 
words, courts have to limit themselves to types of evidence and 
modes of analysis that are equally intelligible to everyone, at 
least in principle, and to employ relatively transparent 
procedures, so that the resulting judgments are defensible as 
something more than mere caprice. If a court can explain its 
reasons for reaching some conclusion, and those reasons are 
generally accepted as valid—that is to say, commonly 
recognized as appropriate to a judicial decision-maker given 
the applicable legal rules, and taking into account the relative 
seriousness of the case—the accuracy or truth of the judgment 
in a metaphysical sense may be rather beside the point. For if a 
court relies on commonly shared premises and modes of 
reasoning that litigants and the public as a whole can recognize 
as suitable, and if it uses those analytical tools to draw what 
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the parties and the public can regard as reasonable inferences 
from facts that are themselves intelligible to, and in some sense 
verifiable by, everyone, then the resulting judgment will have 
intersubjective validity—in other words, the basis for shared 
understanding of its fitness. And if a judgment is grounded in 
that sort of shared understanding, it cannot be written off as 
an exercise of raw power; it must be regarded, even by those 
who dislike the result, as deserving of respect, and ultimately, 
of obedience. 
To be sure, the higher the stakes are, or the more in the 
public eye the controversy is, the more accuracy that both 
litigants and the public as a whole will demand. If a limb from 
my neighbor’s tree falls onto my fence, we might disagree 
heatedly about which of us should bear the cost of the repairs 
and in what amount. But it does not matter very much for 
practical purposes whether a court hearing the dispute orders 
my neighbor to pay me enough to build a new, stronger fence; 
or awards just enough to enable me to patch the broken boards; 
or denies my claim altogether. Pretty much any definitive 
answer will do: As long as there is some mechanism to assign 
fault and assess compensation, I will not need to try to break 
even by stealing my neighbor’s lawnmower—or to get even by 
poisoning his azaleas. But if, for example, the question is 
whether my physician should compensate me for a lifetime’s 
lost wages because of a misdiagnosis, and whether she should 
in the process suffer a substantial blemish on her professional 
record, the stakes are higher; so a judgment bearing greater 
indicia of reliability is warranted. And when the stakes are at 
their highest—as when the question is whether a court should 
impose a severe criminal penalty or announce a new legal rule 
that would affect large numbers of people—the parties and the 
public reasonably demand a judgment with the highest degree 
of accuracy possible. The systematic failure to live up to that 
heightened expectation, especially in well-publicized cases, 
would substantially erode public confidence in the legal system 
as the appropriate means to resolve disputes, thus encouraging 
people to forsake the courts entirely and fall back on self-help 
remedies. If the most significant controversies are seen not to 
be amenable to resolution through the legal system, in other 
words, the fact that the courts handle mundane grievances 
tolerably well is hardly a source of long-term social stability. 
But to say that we expect greater accuracy or certainty 
in the cases where the stakes are high is nothing more (and 
nothing less) than to acknowledge that we demand more robust 
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public justifications for courts’ decisions. Definitiveness alone  
is insufficient: We insist on exceptionally clear, detailed 
explanations for the rulings—explanations grounded in facts 
and legal principles that are both widely intelligible and 
generally accepted as reasonable. 
In demanding more careful, complete justifications in 
important cases, we also shrink, to some extent, the pool of 
potential judgments that might be considered legally 
warranted. For in the first instance, the losing party when the 
stakes are extraordinarily high will likely be unwilling to 
accept an adverse judgment absent strong reasons to think 
that the court (a) considered all the relevant evidence and 
arguments with particular thoroughness and care; (b) applied 
only proper forms of legal reasoning; and (c) drew inferences 
and reached conclusions that are intelligible, reasonable, and 
suited to the seriousness of the case. The more conscientious 
the court has been in rendering its decision, however, the more 
limited the set of possible outcomes will be. Whereas in a minor 
dispute, a judgment might be perfectly good if it does nothing 
more than give the parties bare direction in how to act toward 
one another so that they can get on with their business— 
and hence virtually any decision will do (so long as it can 
practicably be implemented)—in important cases, the greater 
need for publicly justified rulings means that only more 
rigorous and more rigorously fair decision-making will pass 
muster, with the result that more possible outcomes will be 
rejected as illogical, irreconcilable with the evidence, funda-
mentally unfair, or otherwise legally untenable. 
In the end, most of us will only rarely be aware of 
mundane legal disputes that do not involve us; we need only 
believe that, at the most general level, the courts provide a 
reasonably efficient mechanism to resolve those everyday 
controversies. But when a case’s outcome will affect large 
numbers of people (as in toxic-tort suits or suits involving 
corporate malfeasance injuring employees, shareholders, and 
customers alike), or when it implicates our most basic notions 
of liberty (as in criminal prosecutions where the accused faces 
severe penalties) or equality (as in civil-rights actions chal-
lenging official discrimination), we demand that the courts 
provide especially strong public justifications for their rulings. 
For what confers legitimacy on a legal system (thus making 
peaceable resort to the courts the accepted means to resolve the 
disputes that would otherwise have the greatest potential  
to create social divisions and civil unrest) is the ability of 
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everyone, at least in principle, to understand important judicial 
decisions and to regard them as worthy of respect. To be sure, 
intersubjective validity of that sort may not be easy to achieve, 
especially in the most important, most public, and most 
difficult cases—which are, of course, the ones where it is  
most needed. But ensuring intersubjective validity is far more 
modest an institutional aim than discovering ultimate truth. 
So the criticism that courts are not infallible expositors of that 
truth—that they sometimes get things wrong—need not be 
viewed as a fatal blow to a legal system’s legitimacy. 
III. METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM AND INTERSUBJECTIVE 
VALIDITY 
Just as judicial opinions become more persuasive the 
more that judges take care to apply rules and invoke principles 
that are intelligible to and generally accepted by the parties 
and the public, so too do factual findings provide more 
substantial support for judgments when the evidence sup-
porting them can be measured against generally accepted 
standards. When parties and interested observers can weigh 
the evidence for themselves and conclude that the factfinder 
has drawn reasonable inferences and reached warranted 
conclusions, public confidence in authoritative rulings will be 
at its zenith. Considered on that dimension, scientific evidence 
deserves to be regarded as especially useful in court: Science as 
a discipline imposes strict limitations on what can count  
as a scientific truth-claim; so long as those limitations are 
respected, the standards that the scientific community imposes 
for evaluating data and the inferences drawn therefrom will 
also provide intersubjectively intelligible measures of the 
validity and strength of the particular truth-claim at issue. Put 
more simply, science provides accepted tests for whether and to 
what extent opinions deserve to be respected as scientific 
conclusions; and legal judgments that employ those tests thus 
partake of the authority that the scientific method confers on 
robust research results. 
To start with science’s ground rules—what philosophers 
of science call methodological naturalism, but those in the  
lab just call the scientific method—doing science means 
committing oneself to the search for natural explanations for 
natural phenomena. As the National Academy of Sciences has 
put it: 
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In science, explanations are restricted to those that can be inferred 
from the confirmable data—the results obtained through 
observations and experiments that can be substantiated by other 
scientists. Anything that can be observed or measured is amenable 
to scientific investigation. Explanations that cannot be based on 
empirical evidence are not a part of science.5 
Science thus differs from other disciplines not in its 
areas of interest—which are almost infinitely varied, and 
which overlap with matters addressed by philosophers, 
historians, theologians, and scholars in many other fields—but 
in its modes of analysis. Only observation and inference 
confirmable using sense data are regarded as permissible forms 
of scientific inquiry. If we can’t see, feel, hear, smell, or taste 
something, we can’t study it using science (though there may 
be many nonscientific ways to analyze it profitably) because 
only if conclusions are based wholly on empirical observation 
can others repeat, test, and potentially falsify the results. We 
might hypothesize an unseen force—gravity, for example—to 
explain the otherwise unexplainable—why the apple falls from 
the tree. We cannot call gravity a scientific theory, however, 
until we have ascertained that our hypothesis holds up under 
rigorous empirical testing and retains its explanatory power in 
a wide array of conditions. And if the hypothesis cannot be 
tested and potentially falsified, it is not amenable to scientific 
inquiry. 
Methodological naturalism is a pragmatic rule, not a 
deeper philosophical commitment to materialism. The reason 
that science as a discipline limits itself to natural explanations 
is that what is observable, repeatable, testable, and falsifiable 
provides the basis for making useful predictions. If, for 
example, we can explain drug-resistant illnesses in terms of 
evolutionary theory—natural selection acting on populations of 
bacteria undergoing random genetic mutations—we can predict 
how new antibiotics or healthcare practices might minimize the 
growth of drug-resistant strains. 
In making the choice to seek causal explanations that 
allow for prediction, we formally reject nonnatural 
explanations—divine intervention, spirit forces, or anything 
  
 5 WORKING GROUP ON TEACHING EVOLUTION, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
SCIENCES, TEACHING ABOUT EVOLUTION AND THE NATURE OF SCIENCE 27 (1998); see 
also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES & INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, SCIENCE, 
EVOLUTION, AND CREATIONISM 10 (2008) (defining science as “[t]he use of evidence to 
construct testable explanations and predictions of natural phenomena, as well as the 
knowledge generated through this process”). 
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else partaking of the supernatural—as standing outside 
science’s ken. We do so not because those explanations are 
necessarily wrong, but because, by definition, supernatural 
actors or forces exist and function outside the laws of nature, 
doing whatever they please, whenever they wish, and however 
they choose. So the willingness to entertain the idea of 
nonnatural causation as part of one’s scientific research 
program would mean throwing in the towel on the possibility of 
doing science at all: Because one can never prove or disprove 
supernatural explanations—because, in short, “God did it” 
explains everything and nothing—one can never reach 
conclusions about when, where, how, or even whether a 
nonnatural cause will next occur. Each nonnatural cause—each 
act of divine intervention—is sui generis. So we can never 
confirm or reject a supernatural explanation, even in principle; 
a leap of faith is always required. And hence, unless 
nonnatural causes are formally excluded, one can never have 
the slightest confidence in any prediction; supernatural acts 
can always break any causal chain. Rather than being the 
product of natural selection acting on random genetic 
mutations in bacteria, perhaps drug-resistant diseases might 
be the work of some unseen, undiscoverable being or beings 
who occasionally start epidemics in order to keep the human 
population in check, or to test our faith with suffering (as the 
Catholic Church in the Middle Ages viewed infectious diseases 
now routinely cured with antibiotics), or to punish sinners (as 
some fundamentalist-Christian leaders today explain the AIDS 
virus and, for that matter, hurricane Katrina and September 
11). Why bother attempting to develop new antibiotics or to 
formulate better healthcare practices when, from our limited 
point of view, there’s no rhyme or reason to how God, the devil, 
the ghost in the machine, or a merry band of cosmic pranksters 
will act next—unless, of course, we have had the grand plan 
handed to us as revealed truth?6  
  
 6 I do not mean to suggest that pure reason, empirical observation, and 
religious belief or other invocations of nonnatural causes are inherently irreconcilable. 
They may or may not be in tension, depending on one’s theological commitments. But 
while for many if not most people, all three cohere and are mutually reinforcing—a 
philosophical and theological view with a distinguished Enlightenment pedigree but 
roots extending much further back in Western intellectual and religious history—one 
still must necessarily take a leap of faith from science’s empirical observations and 
conclusions to the idea that a supernatural force is working behind the scenes. 
  As Catholic theologian John Haught explained in testifying for the 
plaintiffs in the Kitzmiller intelligent-design case, science and faith need not be at 
loggerheads because science has more modest aims than religion does: It restricts itself 
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In formally excluding from scientific inquiry those sorts 
of explanations for natural phenomena, while still 
acknowledging, of course, that they might be true, and that 
science might be inadequate to tell us everything about 
everything, science as a discipline puts a premium on 
continuing the search for causal explanations that can 
potentially serve as the basis for prediction and responsive 
action. If no natural explanations work, there will be time 
enough at the end of the day to step outside the realm of 
scientific inquiry and invoke nonnatural explanations. The 
alternative—accepting at the outset that the causal mecha-
nisms producing observable phenomena are unknown and 
inherently unknowable—would be a recipe for stagnation, 
encouraging would-be scientists to throw up their hands in 
despair of ever adding to the store of human knowledge or 
solving any practical problem. 
IV. SCIENTIFIC AUTHORITY AND LEGAL JUDGMENTS 
The methodological restriction on the sorts of 
explanations that can count as scientific turns out to have a 
salutary effect for legal proceedings as well as for science itself: 
Limiting research to what is repeatable, falsifiable, and 
testable means drawing conclusions that are empirically 
verifiable using sense data to which everyone has epistemic 
access. If one maintains a commitment to methodological 
naturalism (and therefore refuses, for purposes of conducting 
research, to consider any explanations other than those that 
are falsifiable through empirical observation and testing), then 
what is left as the basis for permissible inferences is equally 
  
to what Haught termed “how” questions (“How do systems function?”), whereas religion 
transcends the material to ask “why” questions (“Why are we here?”). See Kitzmiller, 
400 F. Supp. 2d at 735. 
  Methodological naturalism functions as a bar to scientific exploration of 
the “why” questions, even though scientific discoveries very often have consequences 
for how we think about those bigger metaphysical issues. So while research scientists 
may choose to comment on what they view as the philosophical or theological 
implications of their work, they do so not as scientists but as educated laity. Although 
they may not always be punctilious about informing their audience when they are 
doffing their lab coats to confront questions of faith and spirituality that they regard as 
partially illuminated by discoveries made in their professional capacities, science as a 
discipline requires them to draw a careful line between conclusions within the scope of 
scientific inquiry and those outside it. For an example of appropriate rigor in 
distinguishing between scientific findings and metaphysical views arising in part from 
nonscientific interpretations of those findings, see KENNETH R. MILLER, FINDING 
DARWIN’S GOD: A SCIENTIST’S SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND BETWEEN GOD AND 
EVOLUTION (1999). 
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intelligible to everyone, at least in principle: We all have 
roughly the same capacity to observe, measure, and test, so we 
each, independently, have the ability to assess the validity and 
strength of any inferences drawn from the data. The upshot is 
that science has at its core a strong form of intersubjective 
validity: A conclusion based on evidence derived from research 
properly employing the scientific method inspires confidence 
because everyone can evaluate it using common and relatively 
easily applied criteria (namely, those that a scientific discipline 
sets for itself to test and potentially falsify hypotheses). And 
hence, there is never any need to take it on faith that an 
opinion or assertion is reliable. 
Although science is enormously useful in its own right, 
and has the potential to inspire great confidence in decisions  
or courses of action grounded in it, I certainly do not mean to 
suggest that all invocations of science are inherently trust-
worthy, or that scientific fraud never occurs. Nor are courtroom 
misrepresentations (whether intentional or resulting from 
lawyers’ or experts’ ignorance or lack of preparation) less 
harmful when made by those claiming the mantle of scientific 
authority than when made by anyone else. Quite the contrary. 
If a legal system’s legitimacy turns on the ability of stake-
holders and others to evaluate evidence independently and 
satisfy themselves that judgments are fair, careful, and 
warranted in light of the evidence, the operative legal rules, 
and permissible forms of legal reasoning, then misrepresenta-
tions that play on judges’ and jurors’ lack of scientific acumen 
will distort factfinding and cast a pall over judgments, leaving 
parties and observers to worry that the legal system is 
inadequate to resolve disputes. Obtaining acceptably reliable 
judgments grounded in scientific-expert testimony thus turns 
out to depend, after all, on ascertaining the amount of respect 
that an expert witness’s truth-claims ought to receive. But  
that calculus depends on the degree to which the evidence 
demonstrably bears the indicia of genuine science, and thereby 
takes advantage of the intersubjective validity that the 
scientific method provides—whatever one may think of 
science’s ability to reveal truth in a metaphysical sense. 
In his classic experiments on obedience to authority, 
psychologist Stanley Milgram showed how dressing an actor in 
a lab coat and introducing him as a research scientist could 
cause people from all walks of life, with all levels of education, 
to set aside their own judgment and afford deference—indeed, 
blind obedience—far beyond what reason, or even simple 
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decency, should have permitted.7 Confronted with the apparent 
authority and imprimatur of the scientific community, 
Milgram’s test subjects would obey instructions to deliver 
harmful electrical shocks to another person.8 Believing  
that they were assisting in the conduct of an experiment, 
rather than that they themselves were the subjects of study, 
they would suspend compassion and all sense of moral 
responsibility, delivering shock after shock, in what appeared 
to be increasingly dangerous voltages, just because the fellow 
in the lab coat said that the scientific enterprise required their 
continuing participation.9 
In the courtroom, this white-coat effect leads not to 
blind obedience, but to blind acceptance, though the effect is 
every bit as real—and in high-stakes cases, potentially every 
bit as pernicious. Technospeak alone may be quite enough to 
fool even well-educated nonscientists into thinking that there 
must be merit to what a witness is saying, even if the 
testimony is, in actuality, entirely vacuous. Judges and juries 
may suspend their reason, judgment, and basic common sense, 
accepting arrant nonsense as true just because the witness who 
delivers it looks and sounds like a bona fide scientist. 
Conversely, they may reject science of the highest caliber if the 
witness presenting it does not wear the mantle of scientific 
authority well: A genuine expert who tries too hard to speak 
plainly, or who simply does not cut an impressive figure in the 
witness box, may be unfairly dismissed as a hack or a fraud. 
What could cast greater doubt on the reliability and integrity of 
legal judgments than the realization that ordinarily skeptical 
people, empowered to make decisions about others’ fates and 
fortunes, may base their decisions on unreflective acceptance of 
charlatanism supported by showmanship, ignoring solid 
research backed by training and experience? 
Thus, the problem of institutional competence resur-
faces, albeit at a different level of abstraction: What matters is 
not so much whether judges and juries can independently 
evaluate the data put before them, but whether they can truly 
grasp the nature of science itself in order to ascertain whether 
a statement of opinion should receive the respect that 
intersubjectively valid scientific findings do as foundations for 
  
 7 See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974). 
 8 See id. at 3-4, 16-19. 
 9 See id. at 3-4, 16-23. 
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authoritative judgments. The worry, then, is that if factfinders 
are not equipped to distinguish good chemistry or physics or 
genetics from bad, how much more difficult must it be for them 
to look beneath the particulars of slickly presented expert 
opinions in order to determine not just which side boasts the 
more convincing findings, but whether and to what extent each 
proffered expert is engaging in the scientific enterprise in the 
first place?  
But limitations on judges’ and juries’ ability to parse 
and weigh scientific evidence notwithstanding, my own view is 
that the institutional-competence problem is not nearly so 
hopeless as we often suppose—in part because it turns out that 
courts are better at answering the philosophically rich 
question, “Is it science?” than at resolving the more pedestrian 
question, “Is it good science?” 
One reason why is that the Daubert test10 offers a 
readily administrable formula for ascertaining whether an 
opinion counts as scientific, though not necessarily for 
determining the strength of particular scientific inferences and 
conclusions. Although courts applying the Daubert criteria 
routinely speak in terms of distinguishing good science from 
junk science (a term that encompasses both poor science and 
pseudoscience), what they are really doing, and what, as I read 
Daubert, the Supreme Court meant for them to be doing, is 
distinguishing between science qua science (empirical inquiry 
employing the scientific method), on the one hand, and 
nonscience (inferences and conclusions not derived from 
testable, repeatable, falsifiable observations), on the other. 
Daubert adopts and employs the scientific community’s self-
understanding about what science is, requiring the party 
proffering the expert witness to demonstrate that the data and 
opinions offered satisfy science’s ground rules.11 In the process, 
the Daubert test also brings to light the specific features of the 
evidence that the scientific community itself would use to 
assess the validity, reliability, and explanatory power of any 
purported findings;12 but those added benefits are in a sense 
only incidental to the Daubert inquiry. 
Although most commentators treat the Daubert test  
as though it was designed to address those second-order 
  
 10 See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 11 Id. at 590. 
 12 Id. at 590-95. 
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questions, that conventional view is inconsistent with both the 
test’s specific features and the analytical approach that the 
Supreme Court took in formulating it. The Court did not, after 
all, try to define “good science” or “good enough science” 
according to some qualitative measure. It built the Daubert 
standard on a definition of “scientific knowledge”—the 
operative term in Federal Rule of Evidence 702—that the 
Court drew not from background legal principles or established 
court practices, but from the scientific community’s own 
definition of science as methodological naturalism.13 Thus, the 
Daubert factors are, as formally stated, far better suited to 
discovering whether expert testimony is grounded in the 
scientific method than to deciding how much explanatory 
power an expert’s findings actually have. Whether an expert’s 
procedures or conclusions can be and have been tested and 
whether they have known or potential error rates are, for 
example, straightforward tests for determining whether an 
opinion is falsifiable—not whether it has been falsified. Had 
the Supreme Court meant to focus on the strength of the 
evidence rather than on its classification as scientific or 
nonscientific, the Daubert test surely would have required 
parties to show that their experts’ proffered findings have 
withstood actual testing and that they provide substantial 
explanatory power with demonstrably low error rates. That 
testing is possible and that error rates can be calculated are 
certainly prerequisites to assessing the strength of the evidence 
the way that practitioners in the relevant scholarly field would; 
but in making the Daubert inquiry turn on the threshold 
question of testability rather than on the results of actual 
testing, the Supreme Court effectively instructed the lower 
  
 13 Relying principally on an amicus brief filed by scientific organizations, the 
Supreme Court breathed life into Rule 702’s language by explaining: 
The adjective “scientific” implies a grounding in the methods and procedures 
of science. Similarly, the word “knowledge” connotes more than subjective 
belief or unsupported speculation. . . . Of course, it would be unreasonable to 
conclude that the subject of scientific testimony must be “known” to a 
certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in science. . . . But, in order to 
qualify as “scientific knowledge,” an inference or assertion must be derived by 
the scientific method. 
Id. at 590 (“Science is not an encyclopedic body of knowledge about the universe. 
Instead, it represents a process for proposing and refining theoretical explanations 
about the world that are subject to further testing and refinement.” (quoting Brief for 
the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the National Academy of 
Sciences as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, at 7-8, Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (No. 
92-102), 1993 WL 13006281)). 
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courts to ask “Is it science?” and not “Is it good science?” 
Similarly, publication in peer-reviewed journals and general 
acceptance in the scientific community demonstrate that the 
evidence is sound science that can be taken seriously;14 they do 
not measure the strength of, or confidence in, any reported 
effect. Insofar as either party goes ahead and provides test 
results, error rates, and the like, that information will, of 
course, be highly relevant to the admissibility determination 
under Rule 702 (or else to judgments about the evidence’s 
weight in the merits determination, if it is admitted). But those 
assessments of explanatory power speak only to whether and to 
what degree the evidence will be helpful to the trier of fact—a 
distinct consideration under Rule 702—and not to whether the 
evidence counts as scientific knowledge in the abstract. 
Courts as institutions are, as it turns out, quite well 
suited to conducting the “Is it science?” inquiry that Daubert 
mandates. The weaknesses ascribed to their handling of 
scientific evidence become relevant, if at all, only at the second-
stage assessment—whether the evidence is sufficiently strong 
to be useful to the factfinder if admitted—or in weighing the 
evidence at trial. In part, courts do a decent job performing the 
threshold inquiry because the standards that Daubert imposes 
do not require understanding all the ins and outs of any 
particular scientific claim. But beyond that, adversary court 
proceedings allow for, and indeed encourage, litigants to get at 
the heart of what science is—to educate the factfinder about 
the scientific method—in order to show whether the evidence 
being offered passes muster as science. Although litigants who 
take the additional pains to show how the scientific community 
would evaluate the strength of their experts’ findings may well 
invite more refined analysis of the probative value of their 
evidence, the fact that courts may often accept those invita-
tions should not blind us to how much intersubjective validity 
the threshold inquiry embodied in Daubert alone provides. In 
all events, the basic determination that some opinion is 
scientific is a prerequisite to any second-order tests for greater 
intersubjective validity that a court may choose to employ. 
To illustrate the point, let me draw on my experience 
litigating the intelligent-design case—Kitzmiller v. Dover Area 
  
 14 See, e.g., SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE—WITHIN REASON 107 (2007); 
WORKING PARTY ON EQUIPPING THE PUBLIC WITH AN UNDERSTANDING OF PEER REVIEW, 
PEER REVIEW AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF NEW SCIENTIFIC IDEAS 2-3, 7-10 (2004), 
available at http://www.senseaboutscience.org.uk/index.php/site/project/33. 
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School District15—as the Kitzmiller trial and the decision that 
came out of it bring into sharp relief the difference between the 
“Is it science?” and “Is it good science?” inquiries. Kitzmiller 
involved a battle of experts over whether intelligent design is  
a scientific theory or a nonscientific, religious view—though 
with a substantial measure of the good-versus-bad-science 
debate thrown in.16 The Supreme Court had long since held 
that the Establishment Clause prohibits teaching creationism 
(a religious view) in public schools, even if that view is dressed 
up to look like science.17 So one of the two central questions  
in Kitzmiller was whether intelligent design is simply a 
repackaging of creationism to look like a scientific claim.18 The 
Dover school district tried to recast the controversy, however, 
as an internecine dispute among scientists about whether 
intelligent design is good or bad science, without worrying 
overmuch about how anyone might think that supposed debate 
would turn out. Indeed, the school district’s expert witnesses 
themselves contended only that intelligent design is science in 
its infancy, with one characterizing it as no better than “fringe 
science.”19 As a litigation strategy, that approach was entirely 
rational. The school district did not need to make any more 
robust claims about intelligent design because while the 
Establishment Clause forbids teaching religion in public 
schools, it places no restriction on teaching science (no matter 
how poor or misguided or flaky that science might be). So the 
claim that intelligent design is science would, if true, have gone 
a long way toward insulating the school district’s actions from 
constitutional challenge.20 
  
 15 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 
 16 See id. at 716-23, 735-46. 
 17 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 597 (1987) (striking down a statute 
requiring public schools to teach “creation science” if they teach evolution). 
 18 Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 711-12. The other issue central to the  
case was whether the Dover school board had a religious objective when it added 
intelligent design to the school district’s biology curriculum. Id. at 762-63. Both 
questions mattered because, under the Establishment Clause, governmental action is 
unconstitutional if either its primary purpose or its primary effect is to advance 
religion. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 582-83 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 
(1971)). 
 19 Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 738. 
 20 It would not have done so absolutely, however, because a decision to teach 
or to refrain from teaching even genuine science would violate the Establishment 
Clause if the reason for the choice was school officials’ desire to tailor the science 
curriculum “to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma.” Epperson 
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968). 
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In a thorough, carefully reasoned opinion that has 
earned praise from both the scientific and legal communities, 
Judge John E. Jones III of the United States District Court for 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania found that intelligent 
design does not obey science’s methodological ground rules, but 
instead invokes divine causation: It explains the diversity of 
life on earth by saying, in essence, that “God did it.”21 Hence, 
intelligent design is not science, good or bad, mainstream or 
fringe; it is, the court concluded, a religious view. 
What Kitzmiller shows in spades is that the adversary 
system and the rules of evidence serve incredibly well to allow 
lawyers and expert witnesses to inform judges and juries about 
what science is and how it works, so that the factfinders, in 
turn, can make at least gross distinctions to screen out 
nonscientific beliefs dressed up to look like science.22 As 
Margaret Talbot explained in an account of the Kitzmiller trial 
published in the New Yorker: 
You sometimes hear it said that a courtroom is not a proper venue 
for debating science. In this case, it proved to be an ideal forum. . . . 
  
 21 See, e.g., Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 718-22.  
 22 To be sure, Judge Jones’s opinion in Kitzmiller did not just make gross 
distinctions. Quite the contrary; I am told that Kitzmiller is now required reading  
in many undergraduate- and graduate-level science courses, not just because of its 
clear explanation of the basics of evolutionary biology, but also because of its precise 
exposition of the nature of science itself. 
  Courts need not, however, speak in every case involving scientific-expert 
testimony (or its pseudoscience counterpart) with the precision and detail that the 
Kitzmiller court did. As argued above (see supra Part II), the degree to which courts 
must explain and publicly justify their judgments turns, at least in part, on the 
importance and the publicity of the case. The stakes in Kitzmiller were extraordinarily 
high: Against a national movement to market intelligent-design creationism to public 
schools, to state boards of education, and to legislatures, there stood eleven parents 
who were not only vindicating their own right to decide what religious education their 
children would receive, but also acting as proxies for concerned parents and defenders 
of science everywhere. With so much on the line for so many, on both sides of the issue, 
the court’s legitimacy to decide the case, and thereby to take a step toward quelling the 
larger culture clash over science education and religious control, depended on Judge 
Jones’s issuing an opinion that would provide an almost unprecedented level of public 
justification for the ruling. See Katskee, supra note 4, at 158-61.  
  Those in the intelligent-design movement who have since chided Judge 
Jones for saying too much understood perfectly well what was at stake; they simply 
wished to avoid a definitive legal ruling that might undercut their ongoing attempts to 
foment social controversy. See DAVID K. DEWOLF ET AL., TRAIPSING INTO EVOLUTION: 
INTELLIGENT DESIGN AND THE KITZMILLER VS. DOVER DECISION 7-57, 74-76, 79-92 
(2006); Brief of Amici Curiae Biologists and Other Scientists in Support of Defendants, 
Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, at 6, available at http://www.discovery.org/ 
scripts/viewDB/filesDB-download.php?command=download&id=558; (Revised) Brief of 
Amicus Curiae, the Discovery Institute, Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (No. 04cv2688), 
at 11-12, 20 n.30, available at http://www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/filesDB-
download.php?command=download&id=646. 
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The trial . . . allowed the lawyers to act as proxies for the rest of us, 
and ask of scientists questions that we’d probably be too 
embarrassed to ask ourselves. In a courtroom, you must lay an 
intellectual foundation in order to earn a line of questioning—and so 
the lawyers stripped matters neatly back to the first principles of 
science.23 
What Talbot found so compelling was that, far from misleading 
the court about science, the parties’ presentations of expert 
testimony in an adversary proceeding informed by the 
principles in Daubert revealed the nature and core charac-
teristics of science and scientific truth, thus allowing the  
court (and everyone else) to assess whether the intelligent-
design movement could legitimately claim to be a scientific 
enterprise.24 
The fact that the legal proceedings worked so well to 
expose intelligent design as a nonscientific, religious view 
resting on belief in a supernatural creator is an especially 
strong indicator of what courts and the adversary system can 
accomplish. After all, the intelligent-design movement’s grand 
strategic plan—its raison d’être—is to recast religious belief as 
a simulacrum of science in the hope that judges will have 
neither the skill nor the patience to look behind the façade.25 If 
an adversary proceeding applying Daubert-type criteria could 
prove so effective for stripping away that façade, built up over 
  
 23 Margaret Talbot, Darwin in the Dock: Intelligent Design Has Its Day in 
Court, NEW YORKER, Dec. 5, 2005, at 66. 
 24 I should note that there were no Daubert hearings in Kitzmiller. The 
court’s first opportunity to evaluate the reliability of the expert testimony came during 
the six-week bench trial. But while neither party formally invoked Daubert, the 
Daubert factors were the subtext of both sides’ expert cases because Daubert so effec-
tively encapsulates the scientific community’s own understanding of what science is. 
  The school district did challenge the testimony of Barbara Forrest, a 
philosopher and social historian who gave expert evidence for the plaintiff-parents 
about the history and character of the intelligent-design movement. The school 
district’s counsel sought, unsuccessfully, to discredit Dr. Forrest in order to try to 
persuade the court to exclude her testimony about the movement’s inherently religious 
aims and strategic plan. See Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion in Limine to 
Exclude the Testimony of Barbara Forrest, Ph.D., at 1, Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 
(No. 04-CV-2688), 2005 WL 3628818. But neither party made any attempt to exclude 
any scientific—or putatively scientific—testimony. 
 25 As the Kitzmiller court found, and as many of us have explained elsewhere, 
intelligent-design creationism is a repackaging of so-called creation science (itself a 
repackaging of straightforward biblical creationism) to try to overcome the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Edwards, which prohibited the teaching of creation science in public 
schools. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 722; BARBARA FORREST & PAUL R. GROSS, 
CREATIONISM’S TROJAN HORSE: THE WEDGE OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN (2004); Matthew 
J. Brauer, Barbara Forrest & Steven G. Gey, Is It Science Yet? Intelligent Design 
Creationism and the Constitution, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 22-23 (2005); Katskee, supra 
note 4, at 141-50.  
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decades by a dedicated and well-funded cadre whose sole 
objective was to deceive courts, legislatures, and the public into 
accepting a nonscientific, religious belief as a scientific truth-
claim (so that religion could then be slipped into public-school 
curricula), surely it is not too much to expect courts in general 
to uncover the far less sophisticated attempts to portray 
nonscientific views as science that parties might cook up on the 
fly and try to spoon-feed to a judge or jury in a single case. 
There is also a simpler reason why the institutional-
competence problem is not so serious as many suppose—one 
that brings me back to my initial focus on courts’ institutional 
objective. Even if courts may not infallibly identify the best 
science when they are confronted with genuine disputes in 
which both sides properly invoke the scientific method and 
competing scientific truth-claims may appear to be in 
something close to equipoise, that limitation does not preclude 
courts’ fulfilling their social function. If, as argued above, the 
point of a legal system is to resolve disagreements sufficiently 
fairly and reliably to ensure that people continue resorting to 
lawsuits rather than guns, even when they find themselves 
embroiled in disputes serious enough to threaten social 
stability, entirely correct decisions are not required in every 
instance. Nor, of course, can they reasonably be expected: 
Although ensuring perfect judgments all the time is an 
admirable aspirational goal, we all recognize that perfection of 
that sort is not possible for any human institution. Courts must 
do a decent job screening out pseudoscience—that is to say, 
nonscience posing as science—because it provides no basis for 
the shared understanding that leads to trust in judgments. But 
as long as courts achieve the far more modest aim to foster that 
trust, the rulings that they issue, after weighing legitimate but 
competing scientific claims and applying recognized modes of 
legal reasoning, will have sufficient intersubjective validity to 
make the judgments acceptable to most people most of the 
time. In that case, courts will be able to fulfill their basic social 
function to manage conflict, irrespective of whether they parse 
scientific claims exactly right in any particular case—much less 
whether they invariably and infallibly discover ultimate truth. 
